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ABSTRACT
 
: 
 
The illusion of explanatory depth, which has been identified by
cognitive psychologists, may play a prominent role in encouraging regulatory
action. This special type of overconfidence would logically lead regulators to believe
that they are aware of the relevant causes and consequences of the activities they
might regulate, and of the unintended side effects of the regulatory actions they are
contemplating. So, as with other cognitive biases, the illusion of explanatory depth
is likely to lead to mistakes. And unlike the biases that have been the focus of so
much behavioral economics, the illusion of explanatory depth is uniquely resistant
to correction by those who are aware of it as a general problem and rigorously
attempt to keep it under control.
 
By applying the findings of cognitive and evolutionary psychology to
economic action, behavioral economists have pointed out that the
behavior of market participants does not satisfy the norms of rationality
usually assumed by the mainstream neoclassical economic model.
Herbert Simon (
 
1955
 
) was a pioneer of behavioral economics who
pointed out that neoclassical assumptions may not yield reliable
predictions. Subsequent psychological research, most notably by Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (
 
1974
 
 and 
 
1979
 
), proposed specific biases
that might lead to errors among market participants. Building on these
and other findings of cognitive and evolutionary psychology, behavioral
economists have developed a number of alternative models of market
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behavior that deviate from perfect-rationality assumptions (e.g., Shleifer
 
2000
 
; Barberis and Thaler 
 
2003
 
, 
 
1053
 
–
 
1128
 
; Frey and Benz 
 
2004
 
).
In these psychologically informed models, market participants have
bounded rationality and bounded willpower, and they are not as self-
interested as is usually assumed. More importantly, the cognitive
limitations and decision-making biases of market participants are system-
atic, which makes them important at the aggregate level.
This paper is part of a nascent effort to apply the same type of research
to the actions of the regulators who are charged with correcting or
preventing aggregate-level economic mistakes and other negative social
consequences. It is in the tradition of Timur Kuran and Cass
Sunstein (
 
1999
 
), who have discussed availability cascades in regulation—
self-reinforcing cycles of excessive risk regulation and excessive risk
perception that are spurred by the “availability bias,” i.e., the tendency
to overestimate the likelihood of the salient or recent events that come
to mind easily. Sunstein (
 
1994
 
 and 
 
2000
 
) has pleaded for the sober use of
cost-benefit analysis as a remedy for cognitive biases that might otherwise
drive regulation. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich
(
 
2001
 
) find that judges are not immune to some standard cognitive
illusions, including anchoring, hindsight bias, egocentrism, the represen-
tativeness bias, and the framing effect. David Hirshleifer (
 
2008
 
) points to
the biases that financial regulators may face, including salience and vivid-
ness effects, overconfidence, xenophobia, and scapegoating. These are,
however, isolated and limited attempts to apply non-rational choice,
empiricist approaches to the behavior of regulators.
With the exception of Hirshleifer (
 
2008
 
), these scholars do not argue
that the possibility of successful regulation is fundamentally limited by
cognitive factors, but advocate the use of behavioral economics as an
instrument to improve regulation. But certain findings of cognitive
psychology suggest that a great deal of regulation is likely to fail, regard-
less of the level of cognitive psychology that informs it. Above all, the
very decision to engage in regulation might be a consequence of behav-
ioral biases, such that a regulator of, say, financial markets who is trying
to curb “irrational exuberance” may craft the regulations in a way that
tries to avoid the specific biases that have been identified by cognitive
psychologists, while still erring in thinking that the regulation will
improve matters.
One reason this may happen is the “action bias,” which has been
documented in other areas of behavior (Bar-Eli et al. 
 
2005
 
). Regulators
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who were afflicted with action bias would be likely to respond to a new
problem with a new regulation, even though inaction or the removal of
a previous regulation may be the better response. Thus, overreaction is a
familiar phenomenon following a crisis. Overreaction in air-travel
regulation after September 
 
11
 
, by increasing the cost of flying, shifted
travelers towards driving. But driving is, on average, a riskier means of
transportation than flying, so this regulation may have caused a signifi-
cant number of deaths (Blalock, Kadiyali, and Simon 
 
2005
 
). After the
collapse of Enron, the introduction of stringent corporate-conduct regu-
lation, through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, may have diverted corporate
resources away from actual risk monitoring toward formal compliance
with “transparency” measures that only add to information clutter. It
discouraged companies from going public in the United States and
disturbed the market structure by putting small public companies into
a particularly disadvantaged position (Rezzy 
 
2007
 
; Piotroski and
Srinivasan 
 
2008
 
).
 
1
 
It should also be noted that those who choose to become, say, financial
regulators are likely, 
 
ceteris paribus
 
, to believe that such regulation is
necessary. Whatever beliefs initially motivate this conviction may be rein-
forced cognitively by the selective perception and retention of information
that confirms the initial belief (confirmation bias), in what Jeffrey Fried-
man (
 
2006
 
, drawing on cognitive research in Lord, Ross, and Lepper 
 
1979
 
and Lodge and Hamill 
 
1986
 
) has called a “spiral of conviction.” Similarly,
at the affective level, Ziva Kunda (
 
1987
 
) has demonstrated that people
confirm their beliefs through “motivated reasoning” (cf. Lundgren and
Prislin 
 
1998
 
). These cognitive and affective sources of growing confidence
in one’s initial beliefs, in turn, may be reinforced by “motivated skepti-
cism,” which is to say emotional resistance to counter-arguments
(Johnston 
 
1996
 
; Zuwerink and Devine 
 
1996
 
; Taber and Lodge 
 
2006
 
). The
net result, in the case of regulators, may be an 
 
extra
 
 cognitive bias to action,
buttressed by standard emotional processes of dogmatization.
 
Overconfidence about Complex Phenomena
 
Yet another cognitive bias might play a role in buttressing regulators’
putative inclination toward action: “the illusion of explanatory depth.”
The illusion of explanatory depth is a variant of overconfidence.
Overconfidence, in turn, is the illusion that our personal abilities,
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including our knowledge, are better than they really are. Numerous
experiments have shown that we regularly overestimate the extent of our
own knowledge (e.g., Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 
 
1977
 
). When
people are asked to guess the probability that their answers in simple tests
of factual knowledge are correct, they systematically overestimate the
level of their knowledge. Similarly, behavioral economists have pointed
out that investors tend to be overconfident in their predictions of future
trends, which results in more trading than is rational.
Overconfidence is not limited to our knowledge of facts or our
perceptions of our predictive abilities. It is also present in the percep-
tions of our own comprehension, competence, and understanding of
narratives and other phenomena that lie outside of us. Students in
experiments who are going to be tested on a given subject tend to feel
that they understand the material better than they do, and even the
objective test results do not easily convince them that they had had an
excessive belief in the adequacy of their understanding. Experiments in
textual understanding show that self-assessments of the level of compre-
hension of a text are poor predictors of the real level of comprehension
(Glenberg and Epstein 
 
1985
 
; see also Jacoby, Bjork, and Kelley 
 
1994
 
,
 
57
 
–
 
80
 
).
The texts in question were not particularly difficult. Any scholar,
however, will be familiar with the difficulty of truly attaining a clear
understanding of a 
 
complex
 
 text. Leonid Rozenblit and Frank Keil
(
 
2002
 
) used the phrase 
 
the illusion of explanatory depth
 
 (which they abbre-
viate to IOED) to describe how, in a series of experiments, people
systematically overestimate their understanding of complex phenomena.
The IOED is the belief that we understand the causes, effects, and inner
workings of complex mechanisms, events, and processes much better
than we actually do.
Rozenblit and Keil faced people with specific questions to test the
depth of their understanding—asking them, for example, to explain how
a helicopter can switch from hovering in place to flying forward—and
found that people who thought they understand the basic physics and
mechanics behind a helicopter flight could not answer correctly. Only
after hearing an expert explanation would participants in the experiments
realize that they had been overconfident and revise downward their
estimates of their initial understanding.
Rozenblit and Keil (
 
2002
 
) were able to distinguish the IOED from
other forms of overconfidence, such as overconfidence about knowledge
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of facts (e.g., the capital cities of different countries), overconfidence about
procedural knowledge (e.g., how to operate a device), and overconfi-
dence about the ability to reproduce narrative scenarios (real or fictional).
They found that overconfidence is worst when it comes to explaining
complex phenomena. The IOED is not only qualitatively different from
the other three knowledge illusions; it is also more powerful.
It might be thought that participants in the experiments initially
reported a higher level of understanding than they possessed so as to
avoid embarrassment. But that is unlikely, since the participants
reported that they did not think that the kind of knowledge in ques-
tion was important. Furthermore, the experiments showed that people
overestimate not only their own but also others’ understanding and
explanatory abilities. This is another indication that the IOED differs
from other forms of overconfidence, and that it stems from people’s
oversimplification of the nature and depth of the problem at hand
rather than from excessive self-regard.
Rozenblit and Keil (
 
2002
 
) argue that the IOED is a byproduct of
knowing something more general or more difficult to articulate about a
phenomenon than the aspect that people are asked to explain. The illu-
sion occurs when we have a general, superficial knowledge about some
obvious patterns, and confuse this with insight about the mechanics of
the phenomenon. We rely on visible aspects to construct an understand-
ing of how things work, but that understanding is, in cases of complex
phenomena, in fact very shallow in comparison to the true one. A some-
what different possibility is that we tend to confuse levels of explanation
when there are parallel explanations on different levels of understanding.
We may understand the immediate causes of an event but not know what
is behind these causes, and so on, further and further to root causes. In
the IOED, we see the visible cause-and-consequence mechanism, under-
stand the immediate level of explanation, and mistakenly believe that
that’s all there is to it.
An everyday manifestation of the IOED is that people vastly underes-
timate the work and knowledge involved in making ordinary everyday
devices. Even things as simple as a hammer and a shovel rely on factors
such as relative weight and torque that go unnoticed by most people, but
which are essential to their efficiency and reliability as tools. Thus, most
of us would, if asked, tend to think of these tools as simple to make, even
though they actually originate in complicated engineering processes or
long sequences of trial and error.
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The Illusion of Explanatory Depth in Political Contexts
 
Modern society is precisely the type of phenomenon that is most likely
to foster the IOED. It is a complex order whose skeletal patterns are
recognizable on the surface. While we think we have a good understand-
ing of how it works, the causal relationships within it—generated by
millions or, in the case of the modern economy, billions of people who
interact with each other anonymously, seeking all sorts of unknown goals
based on all sorts of unknown perceptions—are more complicated than
we usually think.
Even causal relationships that economists, for instance, think that they
understand tend to be stochastic. Economists can with some certainty
predict the direction of effects of different causes (such as price ceilings,
which generally lead to shortages), but their ability to predict the magni-
tude of the effects is very limited. Moreover, their knowledge of causes
is reduced to a few large and visible effects, while there are many other
causalities that they cannot reliably predict. These causalities may
produce the unintended consequences that so often frustrate our actions,
or that make the solution worse than the problem. It is precisely our
limited knowledge and limited understanding that make these conse-
quences so surprising to us—“black swans,” as it were.
The evidence for the claim that regulators may be particularly prone
to the IOED is merely suggestive thus far, and for reasons I will discuss,
it may have to remain that way. But an experiment conducted by
Dietrich Dorner (
 
1997
 
) may add some weight to this suggestion.
Dorner’s experiment had participants use computer-simulation models to
undertake land-use planning. As in the real world, the simulations
included competing goals and multiple interdependencies among policy
tools. But the participants did not appreciate the complexity of the situ-
ation. They focused on a few key variables, neglecting the importance of
other factors. They were largely ignorant of the interdependencies in the
system, focusing on the immediate effects of individual problems and
neglecting the potential ramifications of their actions. In short, they
focused on the immediate, visible problems without much regard to
unintended consequences.
The most extreme example of underestimating the problem of manag-
ing complex aggregate structures may have been the Soviet Union’s
attempt to undertake central economic planning in the 1920s. A dusty
chapter of intellectual history shows that this effort commanded
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considerable support from expert academics in the West, whose under-
standing of economics told them that the task of arriving at the right
prices to attach to the myriad goods in an economy was a simple matter
of solving simultaneous supply and demand equations, just as was
routinely done on the economist’s blackboard (Lavoie 1985). Joseph
Schumpeter (1950, 172–86), of the Harvard economics department,
spoke for the discipline as a whole in declaring these “market socialist”
economists the winners in the debate with dissident economists over
“socialist calculation” (of prices).
Today, even though central planning has been discredited, the oper-
ating assumption in mainstream economics and policy analysis is that the
important consequences of regulatory measures can be known to the
regulators, just as economists used to think that prices could be deter-
mined in some manner similar to blackboard calculation. The possibility
of regulatory error is not seriously considered in policy formulation, and
the concept of unanticipated negative ramifications is largely absent from
policy analysis. In some sense, this is almost a necessity, since unlike in
the Dorner experiment, there is no higher expert, standing above the
policy analysts and regulators who come up with new regulations, who
can tell us that the analysts and regulators are ignoring key interdepen-
dencies and other complexities. Assuming that the regulators are doing
their best to craft effective regulations, then naturally they are trying to
anticipate unintended consequences. The question, however, is whether
they are any better equipped to do so than were Lenin’s central planners
90 years ago.
As noted, other types of cognitive bias might be addressed, in princi-
ple, by regulators who tried to keep in mind the findings of behavioral
economics and of cognitive psychology more generally. But when it
comes to the illusion of explanatory depth, it is difficult to envision what
a regulator who is aware of the problem in the abstract might do about it
in practice. In the Rozenblit and Kiel experiments, subjects became
aware that they had overestimated their understanding of complex
phenomena once expert explanations of the phenomena were offered to
them. But that simply moves the level where the IOED might occur back
a step, to the experts who might advise regulators.
The record of economists in the socialist-calculation debate—or in
failing to anticipate the more recent financial crisis—suggests that in the
social sciences, even “experts” are prone to the IOED. Daron Acemoglu
(2009) and David Colander et al. (2009) have outlined in excruciating
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detail the theoretical oversimplifications that caused economists to miss
the crisis and to be at a loss to explain it once it had happened. Jeffrey
Friedman (2009) points out that the regulations that may unintentionally
have caused the crisis were all in line with well-established economic
theories. If so, then it stands to reason that the regulators were not merely
ignorant of the unintended consequences of their actions; they were also
unaware of their ignorance.
This is a situation comparable to that facing entrepreneurs, who, as
Israel M. Kirzner (1973) pointed out, are “radically” ignorant. They are
faced with more than stochastic ignorance; they are also ignorant of
specific things that they need to know but do not know, and they are
unaware of this ignorance: They face “unknown unknowns.” (This is
why they often make losses instead of profits.) Regulators subject to the
IOED are in a similar position. Not only do they not know how society
will react to regulatory fine tuning, but they are not aware of their own
ignorance—or else they would not do the fine tuning. The IOED would
foster regulators’ conviction that they understood what they were
regulating, even if their understanding were severely limited. Unlike
entrepreneurs, however—who would also be prone to the IOED—the
actions, or overreactions, of regulators are not subject to competitive
vetting through tests such as those administered by profit or loss. Thus,
we would expect the IOED, like other cognitive biases, to be mitigated
in markets through the weeding-out of entrepreneurs whose judgments
do turn out to be simplistic. Friedman (2009) points out that there is no
similar competition among regulations, since each of them has the force
of law.
Is the Illusion of Explanatory Depth Important?
Are regulators actually subject to the IOED? Laboratory research that
would test this hypothesis has not yet been done, and if the problem is
real, the research probably could not be done satisfactorily. Presumably
psychologists could establish that regulators are as prone as anyone else to
the IOED. But one could not test regulators for the IOED in their own
field of regulatory authority. Doing so would require designating some
other expert’s judgments as showing the true workings of, say, the banking
system. But this procedure would beg the question of whether the regu-
lator’s own understanding of his area of authority, or the understanding
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of the experts who agree with him, is indeed simplistic in comparison to
that of the “true” expert.
However, since regulators would not deliberately produce regulations
that failed, one might use regulatory failures as a first approximation of
the presence of the IOED. In the United States, alcohol prohibition in
the 1920s famously instigated the emergence of organized crime, with
terrible unanticipated consequences; and prohibition most likely did not
even succeed in its immediate purpose of significantly reducing drinking
(Dills, Jacobson, and Miron 2005). The introduction of mandatory seat-
belts in the 1960s reduced the number of deaths in any given car accident,
but since people feel safer when driving with seatbelts, this regulation may
have made driving riskier and finally resulted in an overall increase of the
number of accidents, and in an increase in fatalities for bicyclists, motor-
cyclists, and pedestrians (Peltzman 1973). The Americans with Disabilities
Act, which had the admirable intention of helping people with disabilities
find employment or keep their jobs, apparently ended up producing the
opposite outcome: By increasing the cost of firing people with disabilities,
the ADA unintentionally increased the cost of hiring them. Thus, the
unemployment rate of people with disabilities actually increased after the
introduction of the Act (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Peltzman 2007).
The regulation of pharmaceuticals by the Food and Drug Administration
slowed down the introduction of new drugs and may, on net, have caused
more unnecessary death and suffering than it prevented (Gieringer 1985;
Higgs 1995; Kazmin 1990; Klein 2000). Subsidies and regulatory measures
aimed at encouraging the use of alternative sources of energy resulted in
higher prices for American corn, which was diverted from world markets
into ethanol production (McNew and Griffith 2005). This, in turn, may
have had the effect of harming the poor in less developed countries. And
these are only some of the visible unintended consequences that we are
able to isolate and quantify.
One could go on listing regulatory failures, but such an exercise would
be insufficient to establish exactly what (I have argued) is necessarily miss-
ing when it comes to complex phenomena: a sense of the magnitudes
involved on each side of the equation. Such lists might be misleading
because it is possible that regardless of the failures, the successes are less
visible or have been insufficiently sampled in lists such as those I have just
presented. If so, it would suggest that the effect of the IOED is insignif-
icant. Moreover, one may legitimately dispute any claim that an item on
a list of harmful outcomes is, in fact, caused by a regulation. “Experts”
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can be found on both sides, each side claiming that the other is simplistic
and that their own interpretation provides more explanatory depth.
Clifford Winston (2006) of the Brookings Institution recently
undertook a comprehensive survey of cost-benefit studies of American
regulation. His conclusion is that in every case except pollution control,
the costs far outweighed the benefits. But the precision of such studies is
suspect. And the researchers who produce them cannot possibly look for
costs or benefits that they have not thought of—that is, costs or benefits
of which they are radically ignorant. Again, then, the expert evaluating
the regulator may himself be subject to the illusion of explanatory depth
when he tries to establish the scope of unintended negative consequences.
Thus, even if we grant that, ceteris paribus, regulators are prone to overes-
timate the beneficial consequences of their actions, we cannot say conclu-
sively whether the unintended harmful consequences of their actions
outweigh both the intended and the unintended benefits of their actions.
Although that problem cannot be avoided, it might be mitigated if we
could find instances where all of the hypotheses converge on regulatory
failures that had extremely severe consequences. The financial crisis may
be one such case. There is at least wide agreement that Federal Reserve
policy played a very significant role in fostering the crisis (Gjerstad and
Smith 2009; Stiglitz 2009; Taylor 2009); other scholars also blame regu-
latory interventions in the housing market (Taylor 2009; Wallison 2009).
Still others point to minimum-capital regulations that encouraged banks
to invest in AA- or AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities (Acharya and
Richardson 2009; Jablecki and Machaj 2009). Moreover, the firms that
issued those ratings were themselves the beneficiaries of regulations that
had, over the course of seven decades, insulated them from competition
(White 2009). And even scholars who blame the failure to regulate bank-
ing with sufficient vigor (e.g., Bhidé 2009; Gjerstad and Smith 2009;
Posner 2009; and Stiglitz 2009) acknowledge that regulators themselves
tended to oppose stricter regulation because of their confidence in the
self-correcting powers of free markets—which shows (if these scholars are
correct) that the IOED knows no ideological boundaries.
Other scholars (e.g., Akerlof and Shiller 2009) have appealed to behav-
ioral economics to explain the crisis, positing “irrational exuberance” in
the housing market, for example. There are also irrationality- (or, better,
emotion-) based theories of business cycles, such as that of Hyman
Minsky (1986). However, these theories were well known prior to the
crisis; it was, in fact, Alan Greenspan himself who used the term
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“irrational exuberance” to describe the dot-com bubble, and there was
lively debate about whether the explosive rise in housing prices from
2001 to 2007 constituted a bubble (Posner 2009, 82–92). Greenspan,
however, did not think he knew how to identify a bubble, as opposed to
a justified runup in prices (due to such factors as rising American popu-
lation and wealth and shrinking supplies of land in desirable cities). He
had the power to pop the bubble by raising interest rates, but he declined
to use this power because he thought that doing so might, in effect, be
caused by the IOED! Does this count as a regulatory failure, and thus a
confirmation of the IOED?
If so, it is only because at this point in the growth of the regulatory
state, there is little that regulators do not have the power to do, such that
both acts of commission and acts of omission that turn out badly can be
classified as instances of the IOED at work. If that seems like stacking the
deck in favor of the significance of the IOED, however, we should
remember that the IOED can be present only if the subject is trying to
understand a complex phenomenon that, by virtue of its complexity, may
defy human understanding. The ultimate question with which we have
been grappling, then, is whether modern societies are, in that sense, truly
“complex” phenomena.
The fact that even experts who do think that they understand modern
society well enough to regulate it disagree among themselves about what
caused a crisis such as the one we have just experienced suggests that
modern societies are, indeed, complex—even if they do not defy every
single human being’s understanding. Some experts will turn out to be
right and others will turn out to be wrong. But the practical question is
how we can know in advance which experts’ predictions are based on a
sufficiently deep understanding of the complexities involved, and which
of them are based on the IOED.
NOTE
1. Hirshleifer 2008 points out that presence salience and availability heuristics after
big events, such as the collapse of Enron, have been at work in this case.
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